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SAMENESS AND SUBORDINATION: THE DANGERS
OF A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION
Commentary on Robert A. Burt'sJudges,BehavioralScientists,and the
Demands of Humanity.
SUSAN P. STURMt
Judges, Behavioral Scientists, and the Demands of Humanity'
grapples with one of the most pressing and difficult challenges of
our time-how to overcome deep and enduring conflicts that
currently divide our community. Professor Burt offers insights into
the importance of empathy and identification in breaking down the
categories that we use to distance ourselves from the humanity of
others and tojustify oppression of those we define as outsiders. His
solution is hopeful, almost noble. He exhorts judges, social
scientists, and by implication, all of us to be our best selves, to focus
on how we are part of one overarching human community, to
emphasize our commonalities, and to transcend our differences.
Professor Burt's interpretation of the Linus cartoon provides a
perspective on the role of empathy and understanding in assessing
moral responsibility and legal consequences. 2 If only Lucy understood, she would have behaved differently. She and Linus could
have worked it out and transcended this conflict. If only we could
see that "all human beings are fundamentally alike," that "each of
us can properly be understood as members of the same human
species whose essential nature develops according to the same
natural rules,"' we would understand each other and get along.
Indeed, Professor Burt asserts that this acknowledgement of

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I want to thank Ed Baker, Sarah
Barringer Gordon, Lani Guinier, Heidi Hurd, Seth Kreimer, Howard Lesnick, Martha
Minow, Barbara Woodhouse, and, of course, Bo Burt for their insightful comments
on this Article.
' Robert A. Burt,Judges,BehavioralScientists, and the Demands of Humanity, 143 U.

PA. L. REV. 179 (1994).
2Professor Burt describes a Peanutscartoon in which Lucy van Pelt discovers her
comic book torn and crumpled on the floor, and confronts her brother Linus with
the question, "Are you responsible for this?" Linus responds, "Am I responsible?
That is a very difficult question." After several frames of Linus's philosophizing and
Lucy's mounting outrage, Lucy rolls up her comic book and hits Linus on the head.
"In the final frame, Linus-stunned and floored, his security blanket knocked from

his grasp-says sadly, 'Her kind never understands.'" Id.
3Id. at 183.
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sameness is a prerequisite to our ability and willingness to transcend
the enduring social conflict underlying our most difficult legal and
social problems.4 He calls on social scientists andjudges to assume
responsibility for resolving these deep conflicts by using their roles
to emphasize our sameness rather than our differences.
I share Professor Burt's aspirations both to transcend enduring
hostilities and oppression and to engage judges and behavioral
scientists in this endeavor. I, like Professor Burt, seek to develop a
framework that promotes understanding and acceptance of all
members of the community and rejects the legitimacy of treating
any individual in a manner that denies his or her status as a human
being. I also embrace the moral premise of Professor Burt's
position-that members of the community share "undifferentiated
moral status" as citizens. 5 Despite this common ground, my
comments on Professor Burt's article proceed from a basic
skepticism about proposals that embrace a universal emphasis on
sameness.
This tension between a common aspiration toward a moral
community and a fundamental difference in our starting assumptions underlies the exchange of ideas embodied in this colloquy. It
has led to an extremely interesting and ongoing exchange of ideas
following the Symposium, including Professor Burt's letter responding to my initial written commentary on Judges, BehavioralScientists,
and the Demands of Humanity. This colloquy illustrates a phenomenon that is quite common to discussions about sameness and
difference. Participants in the discussion frequently talk past each
other because they use the same words to mean very different
things. The risk of misunderstanding becomes accentuated when
the discussion centers on abstract principles and generalized
solutions, rather than concrete responses to particular problems.
The failure to communicate can occur because the discussants are

4 According to Professor Burt,

[W]e can reach moral judgments about one another only if we begin with
the descriptive scientific premise that we are fundamentally alike as a
species; in other words, unless we can understand one another in the same
terms, as members of the same species, we are simply mysterious and
inaccessible to one another and have no basis for making comparative
evaluative judgments of any sort.
Id. at 184.
s Letter from Robert A. Burt to Susan P. Sturm (Sept. 8, 1994), in 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 198 (1994) [hereinafter Burt Letter].
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focusing on different levels of generality.6 It can also occur
because participants in the dialogue begin with different sets of
experiences or concerns which lead them to concentrate on
different aspects of the problem.' They may focus their attention
on different audiences-the Supreme Court, the lower courts, or
actual participants in group conflict. They may proceed from
different assumptions about the potential and role of law as a moral
force and an instrument of social change.' Finally, miscommunication may stem from participants' differing assumptions about
power and its role in structuring possible solutions to subordina9
don.
My response to Professor Burt's emphasis on commonality grows
out of and reflects the dangers of miscommunication inherent in
efforts to address sameness and difference. Each of these differences in perspective and approach has informed and, to some
extent, distorted our communication. Understanding the basis for
this "communication gap" is perhaps the most important lesson that
can be taken from this conversation about sameness and difference.
I readJudges,Behavioral Scientists, and the Demands of Humanity
to go beyond asserting that we all should strive to understand how
we share a common humanity and equal status as citizens. My
reading discerns an insistence on sameness as the predicate for
judicial inquiry, regardless of context or the issue under consideration."
I also perceive a move to descriptive sameness as a
strategy for promoting empathy and transcending social conflict.
Professor Burt calls on scientists to participate in the enterprise of
"emphasizing the proposition that all human beings are fundamentally alike."" This invocation rests on the assumption that scientists can empirically demonstrate commonality and that they should
do so.

12

My portrayal of the role of descriptive inquiry in Professor
Burt's scheme for establishing and justifying sameness prompted his
'See infra pp. 203-04.
See infra pp. 207-10.
8

See infra pp. 215-16.
'See infra pp. 210-15.
See infra p. 205.

n Burt, supra note 1, at 186.
,2The descriptive argument does not depend on scientists' abilities to demonstrate that we are more alike than different. It only requires that, having chosen to
emphasize either sameness or difference, scientists can empirically support that

choice.
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most forceful dissent. One explanation of our communication gap
stems from the differing levels of generality that can frame the
sameness inquiry. Are we speaking of the essential attributes of
human beings qua human beings or the more specific attributes that
might be made relevant by particular legal or scientific inquiries?
Professor Burt'sjustification for insisting on a commonality solution
proceeds at a basic and general level: we are all members of the
same species; we are all members of the human community; and
hence, we are all entitled to equal moral status.
At this level of generality, sameness is a relatively uncontroversial but, in my view, limited observation. It can play a role in
disciplining and forestalling decisions to place individuals outside
the bounds of humanity, such as through the death penalty or
formal exclusion from citizenship. I do not think, however, that
definitional sameness justifies the move to the sameness solution in
other contexts. It seems question-begging to rely on a purely
definitional, conceptual"3 argument-that human beings are alike
as members of the same species-as a basis for the prescriptive claim
that scientists should emphasize sameness. That prescriptive claim
must rest on descriptive claims and moral arguments.
As a descriptive matter, it would be difficult to defend the
position that science can empirically establish our fundamental
sameness once we move beyond the level of membership in the
species. Professor Burt acknowledges this point. 4 However, I
worry that it is very easy to slip from the logical to the descriptive,
from the general to the specific, in one's assertion of sameness and
difference. Indeed, this slippage from the logical to the descriptive,
either by Professor Burt or by me in my original remarks, seems to
15
account in large part for our communication gap on this issue.
By far the more central and significant aspect of Professor Burt's
argument concerns the moral and strategic justifications for
insisting on descriptive sameness rather than difference. Professor
Burt is offering more than a logical justification for employing
s Professor Burt uses the word "logical" to describe this argument, but I prefer
the term "conceptual" to convey this idea.
14 See Burt Letter, supra note 5, at 179.
15For example, Professor Burt offers Thomas Hobbes's naturalistic, scientific
understanding of human nature that people are "fundamentally alike in being by
nature avaricious and self-seeking" as an example of a descriptive scientific premise
of fundamental similarity. Burt, supra note 1, at 184. This seems to be pursuing a
descriptive rather than conceptual argument about fundamental sameness, although
it appears in the paragraph developing the conceptual argument.
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science to emphasize sameness. His approach fulfills a moral vision
and a strategic concern. His moral vision, which I share, is that
people occupy and should strive to achieve undifferentiated moral
status as citizens. This moral choice drives his more strategic
concern: If we focus on difference, we will inevitably end up
justifying oppression.6
To avoid this end, judges should enlist
scientists to emphasize commonalities, rather than differences. We
should ask scientists to determine that differences rarely, if ever,
matter.
It is not clear to me why we should delegate to scientists the
moral or political question of whether sameness or difference
matters in a particular legal or social context. Professor Burt has
acknowledged that this decision cannot be determined on scientific
grounds.' The judgment of sameness or difference is not one that
scientists are any better equipped or authorized to make than other
members of the community. If we direct scientists to make
unilateral moral judgments about sameness and difference, we
encourage them to merge moral and scientific judgments-a
tendency that both Professor Burt and Judge Bazelon have worked
to overcome. 18 We remove from public scrutiny the moral judgment that drove the scientific inquiry. We thus hamper our capacity
as a community to use the knowledge that scientists can provide and
to make responsible moral and political judgments about sameness
and difference. Thus, neither morality nor descriptive truth
provides a justification for a descriptive sameness solution.
This leaves the strategic argument for descriptive sameness.
Professor Burt recounts and appears to endorse the belief that "if
human beings focused clearly and rationally on the descriptive
scientific proposition that we are all fundamentally alike in our
nature, then we would be more inclined to view one another with
sympathy, with mutual understanding and fellow feeling." 9 For
me, science's effectiveness in promoting empathy depends on the
context and dynamics surrounding the use of information, rather
than on science's emphasis on sameness as opposed to difference.
In some contexts, insistence on sameness can take on an artifiSee Burt, supra note 1, at 193 ("[U]nless judges and scientists alike emphasize
our human commonalities-unless they emphasize the underlying social and psychological forces that can promise to draw us together-then we will be fated to drive one
another further and further apart.").
'7 See Burt Letter, supra note 5, at 195.
18See Burt, supra note 1, at 182-84.
, 9id. at 184-85.
16
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cial-even disingenuous-quality that can easily backfire as a means
of transcending social conflict. Facts in and of themselves will not
necessarily alter attitudes or behavior, nor will they lead people to
acknowledge commonality. The impact of information depends on
a context that permits and encourages meaningful communication
and assimilation of that information.
Consider the siblings, parents, or teachers of a mentally ill
person. They may perceive and emphasize differences in experience, capacity, and needs of the mentally ill and yet appreciate their
humanity, their human spirit, their capacity to enjoy life. The issue
is not one of factual similarity but of recognition of similarity in
one's status as a person and a citizen entitled to respect, dignity,
and some measure of control over one's actions. These judgments
are moral and political, not empirical; they flow from acceptance as
much as identity. It is not difference, but the social and normative
significance of difference, that generates and perpetuates conflict.
The importance of context and power in defining the significance of difference leads me to question the wisdom of a sameness
solution for judges as well as for behavioral scientists. I do not
think that citizens' undifferentiated moral status can justify insisting
on sameness in contexts that do not threaten to exclude individuals
or groups from membership in the community. If we are considering actions that would place individuals outside the bounds of the
human community, such as a decision to disenfranchise a given
member or subgroup of the population, equal status as citizens is
morally relevant and even dispositive.
However, many legal
problems do not require drawing outer boundaries of citizenship.
Often, judges face more subtle and complex normative judgments
that pose such questions as what "citizenship" means, what
constitutes fair treatment by the community, or what affirmative
obligations to its members the community bears. For example, the
question of the appropriate response to state laws mandating
disability leave for pregnant workers requires a court to decide
whether to focus on equal access to disability leave or on the right
to work and have a family. The general principle of equal and
undifferentiated moral status as citizens does not dictate the
appropriate response to such particularized "dilemmas of differ20
ence."
" Martha Minow, Foreword:JusticeEngendered,101 HARV. L. REv. 10,40-42 (1987)
(defining the dilemma of difference as situations in which either acknowledging or
ignoring difference will perpetuate inequality, and illustrating the principle through
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Indeed, framing the issue in terms of sameness versus difference
poses rather than answers the moral and political questions at stake
in many cases. For example, consider the issue of poverty's role in
defining criminal justice policy. If, asJudge Bazelon urged, criminal
law takes social and economic deprivation into account in assessing
criminal responsibility, is that focusing on sameness (these conditions would likely affect the behavior of any human being) or difference (those who suffer social or economic deprivation may
experience the world differently)?2 1 Robin Williams illustrated
precisely this point in an episode of Sesame Street that aired the
morning of the Bazelon Symposium. He stood next to a bird and
said, "You may think we are different but we are really the same.
We have the same name. We both have two eyes, a mouth, and
need food. There is one way in which we are different. I can't
22
sing."
Professor Burt's work exhibits an awareness of these observations about the social construction of sameness and difference. He
nonetheless "espous[es] a hierarchy of values, with mutually
acknowledged commonality ranking above mutually acknowledged
respect for differences" 2 --an approach that I reject in favor of
contextualized judgments about the relevance of sameness and
difference. This disagreement led us both to search for deeper
roots of our differing perspectives. 24 One important explanation
lies in the picture of social conflict that informs our analysis of

sameness and difference.

Professor Burt's paradigmatic social

conflicts are first-generation forms of exclusion and oppression-the

the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of pregnancy discrimination in California

Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) and Wimberly v. Labor &
Indus.
21 Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987)).

See DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW

50-51 (1988). Bazelon stated:
It could be said of my view in Brawner,as Judge Learned Hand said of Durham, that it creates more problems than it solves. I would only change that
to read: it recognizes more problems than it solves. If, in a given case

involving criminal responsibility, social and economic deprivation is a
substantial component of behavior, evidence as to this personal history
should not be categorized as "irrelevant" and therefore excluded. The issue
of criminal responsibility, like other subjects in the criminal law, does not
permit us to ignore the relationship between antisocial conduct, on the one
hand, and poverty and social injustice, on the other.

Id. at 51.
1 Sesame Street (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 1, 1994).
1 See Burt Letter, supra note 5, at 198.
See id. at 198-99.

24
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Holocaust, forced sterilization of mentally disabled people, legally
mandated segregation, and the death penalty. 25

In each of these

settings, difference is used to justify deliberate exclusion and
subordination.
The dominant group, through the state, uses
difference to define members of particular groups and to place
those group members outside the bounds of the community as
unworthy of the moral status afforded to citizens.
Professor Burt's approach to difference grows out of his deep
and abiding concern to avoid "the depths of human brutality
revealed by the Holocaust." 2' He is worried about the use of
science and law "in the justification on supposedly scientific
grounds of the subordination and ultimate annihilation of some
people by other people." 27 He perceives an ever-present specter
of mutually destructive cruelties.2 ' This intensely polarized and wartorn context defines his sense of risk and possibility. In such a
context, emphasizing differences indeed heightens the prospect that
marginalized groups will become targets of oppression and abuse.
As the daughter of a Dachau concentration camp survivor and
a student of American corrections policy, I view human conflict with
a picture of state-sanctioned brutality in mind.2 9 What these
pictures leave out, however, are a series of contexts and experiences
that are just as germane to today's enduring conflicts. My recent

' I use the term "first generation" to refer to legally mandated forms of exclusion
and subordination. "Second-generation" discrimination refers to exclusion and
subordination stemming from bias, albeit not pursuant to state mandate. "Thirdgeneration" exclusion and subordination refer to institutional practices and
conditions that embody the standards and values of the dominant culture and have
the effect of excluding members of particular groups.
26Burt, supra note 1, at 185.
27
id.
2
See id. at 185-86. This theme emerges in Burt's earlier works as well. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455,
465 (1984) ("[T]he Supreme Court through constitutional litigation vividly shows how
easily political conflict becomes transformed into diametric opposition regarding the
fundamental tenets of our society and how such opposition can lead thus to the brink
of cvil war .... ").
' See generally Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Futureof CorrectionsLitigation, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993) (establishing a framework for examining the role of
litigation in correctional advocacy); Susan P. Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma:
Strategies ofjudicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1990) (exploring
problems and methods ofjudicial intervention in prisons). My father was arrested
the day after Kristallnacht, November 9, 1938 and interned in Dachau. He was
released seven weeks later and fled to England. A year later he emigrated to the
United States. He returned to Germany and to his home town of Augsburg as a
soldier in the United States Army.
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experiences as a teacher of two law courses, Critical Perspectives on
Race and Gender, and Employment Discrimination, offer pictures
of second- and third-generation forms of exclusion, oppression, and
inequality that do not involve explicit state policies of oppression.
The day-to-day realities underlying current social conflicts, particularly racial conflicts, involve concerns about marginalization,30
neglect, informal exclusion, material deprivation, and unfairness.
Some of this continuing subordination can be attributed to
intentional forms of exclusion, albeit "disguised and reiterated" in
more subtle and coded forms.3 ' However, deception is not the
only explanation for the persistence of subordination and exclusion.
It is also perpetuated by the value choices reflected in prevailing
conceptions of merit, access, and participation. Legal and institutional conventions embody the values, cultures, experiences, and
modes of interaction developed during a period when Blacks,
women, the mentally disabled, and other "different" groups were
formally excluded from civil life. In some situations, these conventions continue to favor the dominant group's identity, culture, and
values over those of others for whom group identification carries
tremendous significance.3 2 Those who do not conform to the
picture of success embodied in traditional institutions may face
" For a discussion of the social and economic conditions surrounding racial
conflict and separation, see generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS
(1993); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of
Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325,328 (1992) ("[T]he persistence and power of racism
ought to be seen as an importantpart of the social 'context' with which constitutional
norms regarding equal protection and racial justice interact."); Regina Austin, "A
Nation of Thieves"." Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 148-53 (describing continued disrespectful and disparate
treatment suffered by Blacks in commercial settings).
For discussions of gender and inequality, see MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION
OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Minow, supra
note 20, at 10 (discussing the approach taken by the 1986 term Supreme Court
towards analyzing cases involving gender issues); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 797-98 (1989) (discussing the split among feminist
theorists over the emphasis on similarities or differences between women and men).
" Professor Burt eloquently states this point in his letter. See Burt Letter, supra
note 5, at 198.
" See Lani Guinier, [EiracingDemocracy?, 107 HARv. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994)
(manuscript at 47-50, on file with author) ("For many racial minority group members,
their racial group membership is meaningful and its meaning is not simply the result
of formal government-sanctioned discrimination in the past.... [Mlinority group
membership is essential to identity and facilitative of political participation .... ").

210

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 143: 201

exclusion, subordination, and failure-regardless of their capacity to
contribute.3
Professor Burt's preoccupation with addressing deliberate bias
and oppression, even in the face of oppression that stems from
institutional practices such as stereotyping, biased standards, and
neglect, explains at least part of my discomfort with his universal
emphasis on sameness. As many feminist theories have noted,
insisting on sameness in the face of difference can itself perpetuate
subordination. 4 Indeed, this insistence on sameness itself denies
one of the most basic needs of the black community-acknowledgment and recognition. 5 Those who were previously
excluded as a group from membership in the community may be
unwilling to engage in the process of identifying common ground
unless they have confidence that their identities-their differences-will be respected.
I do not think that normative choices between sameness and
difference can appropriately be divorced from the issue of power.
At least some outsiders who seek legitimation of their voice and
" See generally Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One
Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994) (discussing the experiences of
women in law school and analyzing their academic performances and career plans in
comparison and contrast to those of male students).
4 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION

AND AMERICAN LAw (1990). Professor Minow argues that
[t]he stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by
focusing on it. Decisions about education, employment, benefits, and other
opportunities in society should not turn on an individual's ethnicity,
disability, race, gender, religion, or membership in any other group about
which some have deprecating or hostile attitudes. Yet refusing to acknowledge these differences may make them continue to matter in a world
constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind.
Id. at 20; see also Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1163-70 (1986) (discussing
the importance of examining both similarities and differences between women and
men when examining gender issues, rather than focusing on one or the other);
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1316
(1987) (arguing that women's "equality interest is infringed by having everything that
is associated with women defined as less valuable, less necessary to consider, less
important"). See generally Williams, supra note 30 (addressing the problems of
categorization, definition, and objectivity in perpetuating the rift between social
transformation and theoretical legal understanding).
" See Howard Winant, Difference and Inequality: Postmodern RacialPolitics in the
UnitedStates, in RACISM, THE CITY AND THE STATE 108, 117 (1993) ("The needs of the
'others', both political and cultural, cannot be addressed from this [universalist]
perspective, since the most basic need that racial minorities have is that of,
recognition.").
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their place in the community are likely to be suspicious of claims by
insiders that "we are all alike.""6 These claims by those in power
may well be perceived as self-serving and patronizing of the minority
group's fundamental concerns, and thus as ultimately silencing. It
is perhaps because this power dynamic was ignored that I originally
read into Professor Burt's insistence on sameness the message to
outsiders: "If you think you are different, then you are mistaken.
Let us educate you as to how you are just like us. This is not about
values. It is about truth."
I think that this skepticism about a universal sameness approach
is warranted as a general matter. Claims of universal sameness
allow us to impose norms embedded in the status quo without
acknowledging that we are doing so, and without responding to
those putting forward a different normative agenda. It also absolves
the mainstream from responsibility to listen, to question assumptions, to change, to adjust, or to compromise. Difference (or
sameness) then appears natural, inevitable, intrinsic, and neutral,
rather than "a clue to the social arrangements that make some
people less accepted and less integrated while expressing the needs
and interests of others who constitute the presumed model.""
A universal emphasis on commonality in characteristics,
regardless of the context or purpose of the legal or scientific
enterprise, places less powerful groups in a high-risk position. By
accepting the paradigm that sameness mandates inclusion, we invite
the reverse application of this argument: that difference justifies
exclusion. If people perceive difference to exist, they will then feel
justified in treating people differently. Those who are in fact
different, when evaluated by the dominant norm, may then be
legitimately excluded or oppressed. By ignoring differences that
may in fact matter, we thus leave minorities vulnerable to the racial
' As Leonard Rubenstein, the Director of the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, reminded me after my oral remarks, the concern about respect
for difference does not necessarily characterize the basic concerns of many mentally
disabled people who are striving to be included and respected as equals. The person
in the wheelchair who has previously been excluded from the workplace wants to be
treated "the same" as everyone else. Yet this person would also like a ramp to get up
to the front door. These observations underscore for me the importance of adopting
a contextualized approach to sameness and difference, rather than insisting on either
sameness or difference as the universal solution.
37 MINow, supra note 34, at 53; see also ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEEDED
TO KNOW I LEARNED IN KINDERGARTEN: UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON THINGS

83-85 (Villard Books 1988) (1986) (relating the Mermaid Story, a parable whereby a
small child discovers that she does "not fit the norm").
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trump card. Those who make and enforce the rules can determine

when to expose and act on the difference that we knew was there all
along.
The commonality approach hides the allocation of power
embedded in the ideal of uniformity. Professor Burt talks about
mutual understanding, which suggests an interactive process, but
the fundamental premise of legal and scientific discourse-sameness-is imposed from above by judges and scientists.
This choice is contested by at least some of those whose status is the
subject of judicial inquiry in these cases. Predetermining a
hierarchy of values for all situations reinforces the perspective and
value choices of those in power. The commonality approach
articulated L. Professor Burt's paper takes for granted that we treat
"them" solely as objects of discussion, not as participants discussing
their fate. This approach is inevitable, and thus not inherently
objectionable, in efforts to eliminate first-generation forms of
exclusion because the group in power must first address its own
conduct to recognize and include the outgroup.5 s However, this
hierarchical approach need not dictate the structure of discourse
addressing second- and third-generation forms of exclusion. Unless
we address the power balance implicit in the sameness approach, we
risk perpetuating it in our efforts to address subordination.
A universal sameness solution also fails to take into account
differences in the normative function of criminal law, civil rights
law, and mental disabilities law. It treats issues of difference in each
of these legal contexts the same. This approach glosses over
potential difference., in the roles of criminal law, mental health law,
and civil rights law. Some would argue that criminal law is closest
to the paradigm of exclusion that most concerns Professor Burt. It
is necessarily and tangibly violent and unilateral by design. 9 One
of its explicit functions concerns setting boundaries, both of
acceptable behavior and membership in the community. In this
s I am indebted to Howard Lesnick for this point.
s See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1607 n.16 (1986)
(stating that the violence of criminal law is relatively direct and pervasive). Both
Judge Bazelon and Robert Burt embrace criminal law's pedagogical, transformative
role, as well as its boundary-setting function. See BAZELON, supra note 21, at 26
(stating that the criminal law "provides an opportunity to educate ourselves about the
people who commit crimes, so that we can begin to do more than strike back at them,
one at a time"); Robert A. Burt, Cruelty, Hypocrisy, and the Rehabilitative Ideal in

Corrections, 16 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359, 368-69 (1993) (urging "rehabilitation of
the rehabilitative ideal" to promote a commitment to the possibility of "reconciliation
between the offended and the community").
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context, distinctions based on categories such as race and disability
may be more likely to function in the oppressive and brutalizing
40
manner characteristic of Professor Burt's paradigm.
This paradigm does not adequately respond to the challenges of
civil rights law. Many current issues facing civil rights law, such as
school desegregation, affirmative action, and disparate impact
discrimination, involve second- and third-generation forms of
exclusion. One of the most persistent failures of civil rights
doctrine in these areas concerns the inability to develop a new
framework to accommodate the demands of commonality and
difference, individuals and groups, justice and fairness. In this
context, slavish adherence to a sameness solution merely plays out
and perpetuates the inadequacy and instability of the courts' civil
rights jurisprudence.
Thus, injustice and oppression can flow from applying a
sameness approach, developed for first-generation forms of
deliberate exclusion, to second- and third-generation types of
subordination. I do not mean to suggest that a universal-difference
approach would be preferable. Indeed, in the context of deliberate
exclusion based on status, emphasizing commonalities in moral and
political status is crucial to delegitimizing inequality. Instead, I am
questioning the wisdom of an absolutist approach to sameness and
difference. The meaning and dangers of emphasizing difference
cannot be assessed universally for all time and concerning all issues.
It must be situated in a particular set of questions, concerns, and
possibilities. 4
Professor Burt's choice of a universal rather than a contextualized approach emerges from what I see as an organizing premise of
his paper: we must choose between binary, polarized, and mutually
exclusive alternatives. 42 We cannot avoid choosing between
"measured hypocrisy" and "openly voiced hostility," 43 between
sameness and difference, between rehabilitation and the death
40 Even in the criminal context, we build in the capacity to differentiate between
people based on different forms of conduct. Although universal sameness helps in
defining the morality and legitimacy of the penalties we impose, such as the death
penalty and inhumane prison conditions, it does not determine the normative content
of those legally relevant categories of difference.
"' To use Professor Burt's metaphor, whether one sees the glass as half full or half
empty may depend on what is in the glass-medicine that tastes bad or a milkshake
that you want to savor. See Burt, supra note 1, at 187-88.
42 See id. at 187 ("A scientist can choose one or the other emphasis; but-and here
is the crucial point-the scientist must make one choice or the other.").
4 Burt, supra note 39, at 368.
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penalty, between empathy and aversion, between harmony and
subordination. We cannot simultaneously see the glass as both half
full and half empty, both the duck and the rabbit as the duckrabbit." He illustrates the difficulties and dangers of focusing on
difference with the example of our response to the mentally ill. We
must choose between fear and pity, empathic identification and
differentiated aversion, and recognize the clear normative implications of our choice. Faced with these stark alternatives, the choice
of universal sameness seems defensible and even reasonable.
The sameness solution depends for its legitimacy on ajustification of the premise that we face polarized and mutually exclusive
choices in dealing with issues of sameness and difference. Professor
Burt offers empirical, moral, and strategic justifications for his
polarized framework.
The empirical argument rests on the
observation that "our perceptual, cognitive capacity does not permit
us to see both elements at the same time," and that "either side, if
dwelled upon, tends to magnify itself and render the opposed
perception increasingly out of reach, conceptually implausible, and
impossible to imagine. " "
Are our perceptual and normative choices really so impoverished? What about the reactions to difference, such as fascination,
intrigue, and romanticization? What about difference as instructive?
As exotic? I disagree with the notion that the range of potential
reactions to difference is limited to a choice between two mutually
exclusive opposites.
This is not to challenge the observation that many of us do
sometimes perceive the world and frame discourse in binary,
polarized terms that force us to pick a winner and a loser. 46 This
tendency may be a function of the tendency of language and
reasoning to "treat categories as clear, bounded, and sharp
edged." 47 It may be attributable, in part, to gendered modes of
discourse embodied in legal analysis.4 1 It certainly reflects a
" See Burt, supra note 1, at 187-88.
45 Id. at 188.

' Indeed, my own remarks, which struggle to offer a more contextualized,
participatory frame, may have in some instances presented a more starkly polarized
picture of our perspectives than may be warranted. Yet this polarized reaction was
prompted by my perception that the sameness perspective was being applied in a
manner
that ignored the significance of power.
47
MINOW, supra note 34, at 59.
48 See generallyDEBORAHTANNEN, GENDERAND DISCOURsE 40-46 (1994) (exploring
"how male adversativeness and female cooperation are played out, complicated, and
contradicted in conversational discourse"); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T
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tendency in our adversary culture to organize the world in binary
and mutually exclusive categories. However, this polarization is
neither universal nor inevitable. Other perceptual and institutional
approaches exist that enable us to integrate varied perspectives and
maintain perceptual complexity. This is particularly true if we are
willing to move from individuals to groups as decision-makers.
Another possible justification for insisting on a choice of
sameness, or at least a preordained hierarchy, can be inferred from
a vision of the law as a moral teacher. One could argue that to
cultivate a moral community, it is necessary to develop a consistent
and coherent moral position.49 Under this view, the rhetorical
power of the law to influence attitudes and behavior depends on the
courts' articulation of a clear, simple, and universal message."
Contextualizedjudgments about sameness and difference will dilute
the power of the message and create the risk of moral cacophony.
In a homogeneous community, this vision of the role of the law
has considerable appeal. However, I fear that the effort to realize
this vision in a society of diverse communities and competing moral
visions is doomed. For the law to fulfill this rhetorical role, its
audience must comprise members of the same interpretive community. Diverse community members must be willing and able to hear
and internalize the law's message. But in a polarized community,
a theme of commonality conveyed in an adversarial setting is
unlikely to be heard by either party to the conflict. The dominant
group may perceive the emphasis on sameness as ajustification for
ignoring the concerns of a subordinated group. It will likely be
interpreted by subordinated groups as a justification for their
exclusion and marginalization. Law's rhetorical force thus requires
the same shared understanding that Professor Burt seeks to achieve
through law.
Even if one were to accept the vision of law as moral teacher,
that does not justify adopting the universal sameness solution.
MEN AND WOMEN IN CONVERSATION 24-31 (1990) (identifying
tendencies of male discourse to seek universal principles that permit ranking,
establishing hierarchy, and finding fixed and certain solutions, and of female
discourse to establish rapport).
49 1 am indebted to Seth Kreimer for this insight.
'o Professor Burt has explicitly expressed faith in law's rhetorical power in other
works. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 28, at 46&("I believe, however, that the gravitational
UNDERSTAND:

pull specially exerted on deeply divisive disputes by courts in our institutional scheme,
coupled with their palpable weakness in imposing effective force on the disputing
parties, gives courts a pedagogic advantage over other institutions .... ").
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Except at the most basic, definitional levels, sameness and difference do not capture the normative message that seems to drive
Professor Burt's argument. The key normative concern is better
captured by the principle that subordination is bad. This moral
principle must also be contextualized to assume meaning, but it is
more likely to guide us to the relevant empirical and moral issues
than the sameness-difference debate.5 '
Finally, the insistence on a universal solution may stem from a
fundamental mistrust of our capacity to make moral, contextualized
decisions about sameness and difference.
This fear may be
grounded in a basic perception of a "stubborn impulse toward social
relations based on subordination and oppression."" The prediction that judges, scientists, and citizens will use difference to justify
oppression may also underlie the decision to resort to a clear,
universal position targeted at discouraging the most blatant forms
of oppression.
I fear that there is a self-fulfilling quality to this decision to
structure our choices entirely around preventing the worst abuses.
This approach ignores the role of law in structuring and facilitating
day-to-day interactions. It reinforces the culture of conflict that
frames difference as inevitably destructive and violent. It forces
discussions about difference into a frame of moral blaming, which
simplifies, distorts, and polarizes discussions about difference.
I also doubt that a universal sameness approach can avert the
hostility and violence that most concerns Professor Burt. Unlike
Professor Burt, I think that we must simultaneously address
deliberate oppression and exclusionary institutional arrangements
to make progress on either form of subordination and oppression.5" Moreover, insistence on a sameness paradigm is likely to
51 See C. Edwin Baker, Content-BasedRegulationof Personsand Preasses, 1994 SuP. Cr.

REv. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 82-84, on file with author) (articulating that
subordination, rather than color blindness, provides substantive content to equal
protection analysis, and that "any observation that a practice uses race as a criteria
[sic] and, therefore, strict scrutiny applies merely diverts attention from determining
whether a substantive evil identified by equal protection theory is present").
52 Burt Letter, supra note 5, at 198.
'3 Professor Burt has stated:
I believe that the first-generation forms are exceedingly difficult to dislodge
in relations between oppressors and oppressed and that unless and until
these forms are expunged-unless and until the oppressors fully admit to
themselves and acknowledge to their previous victims that neither group is
inherently superior.., this second step of mutual respect for acknowledged
differences cannot be reliably achieved.
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stifle discussion and discourage efforts to identify why difference
does or does not matter in a particular context. It pushes that
conflict underground, and delegitimizes decisions that fail to
correspond with widely shared experiences. It fails to provide a
forum for structured discussion and resolution of conflict stemming
from perceived and actual differences. It accentuates the hostility
and mistrust of those for whom difference matters. These consequences, if left unaddressed, can also erupt into violent social
54
conflict.
I have a more bottom-up view of how moral communities form
and how ajust society is achieved. We cannot achieve understanding and resolve conflict without engaging those who are fighting.
It is not enough to change social imagery; the imagery must be clear
to those participating in the conflict. By artificially constraining the
moral and political choices implicated by a particular decision, we
will only impoverish our moral vision. Fair, just, and effective
conflict resolution requires engagement and dialogue, as I believe
this extended colloquy illustrates. This cannot occur if a perspective
is stifled or ignored. It cannot occur symbolically, but only through
ongoing interaction by those who disagree and who constitute the
relevant community. In at least some situations, the moral
sensibility of commonality can only emerge from, rather than
precede, the decision-making process.
My remarks embrace the premise that fair and just choices about
sameness and difference can best be made in contexts that enable
and encourage responsible engagement. Transcending enduring
social conflict requires that we develop a richer and more subtle
framework of perception and interaction around issues of race, sex,
disability, and other categories of difference. We need not adopt
ajurisprudence and process that permanently privileges one picture
of subordination and exclusion over the other. Law should struggle
to accommodate both of them. The challenge is to develop
processes that permit empathy and cooperation to develop within
the current adversarial culture.5" We must introduce intermediate
Burt Letter, supra note 5, at 197-98.
' An example of this outcome can be found in news reports of the Los Angeles
riots. See An Urgent Needfor Dialogue on Race Relations in America, Focus ON STUDY
CIRCLES (Study Circles Resource Ctr., Pomfret, Conn.), Summer 1994, at 2,3 ("Many
reporters said the riots were ...about poverty, despair, and exclusion from the
wealth and opportunities of the larger American culture.").
55
See BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousnessand
the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 988-91 (1993) (urging
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structures and processes that encourage constructive conversation
and problem-solving around issues of difference. These institutions
need not-indeed cannot-entirely replace the adversary framework;
rather, they would comprise a significant component of a comprehensive array of legal institutions available to address social conflict.
The way to pursue commonality is not to advocate sameness, even
in the face of pervasive, though perhaps socially constructed,
differences. We cannot go back to an ideal developed in a world in
which those who were "different" did not participate fully as
citizens. Instead, we must question and be willing to change the
categories and institutions that create the subordinating and divisive
significance of difference. It may be that the way to integrate
competing but equally valid perceptions and understandings is by
including those who see the world differently in the decision-making
process and by assuring them the capacity to participate and have
a meaningful voice in determining their status.
We cannot
successfully alter rhetoric and resolve or transcend conflict without
altering the process and power dynamic of judicial decision56
making.
My discomfort with descriptive sameness as an organizing framework for behavioral scientists does not mean that I reject Professor
Burt's worthy goal of enlisting behavioral scientists in the struggle
toward "harmonious social relations."" I do not seek to throw the
scientists out of the decision-making process, but rather to cast
them in a more modest, participatory role. We should be able to
identify behavioral scientists' normative assumptions and choices.
We should insist that they not make the moral and political choices
alone or without the opportunity to question those choices from a
variety of perspectives. This would require processes that enable
judges and stakeholders in a particular conflict to participate in
framing and understanding the moral and political assumptions and
choices that are embedded in scientists' findings." These process-

a move from blame to responsibility in the context of race discrimination).
' See Susan P. Sturm, The Promiseof Participation,78 IOWA L. REv. 981, 1007-08
(1993) (discussing preliminary efforts to develop this model ofjudicial process in the
public remedial context); see also Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theoy of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355,1427-44 (1991) (proposing a framework for a deliberative
model of public remedial decision-making).
"' Burt, supra note 39, at 369.
'See Martha Minow, LearningfromExperience: The Impact ofResearchAbout Family
Support Programs on Public Policy, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 221 (1994). Minow proposes
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es would also encourage scientists to limit their judgments about
commonality or difference to the context that supports and justifies
those judgments.
We must go back to basic principles and ask what science and
law offer to help us answer our difficult normative questions. These
methodologies do not provide a given, fixed perspective to be
superimposed on every problem. Rather, scientific inquiry affords
us the capacity to put individual cases into a broader context, to ask
a series of structured questions that provides a framework for the
particular case under consideration. Law offers us the aspiration
toward justice and the possibility of a structured context in which
to grapple with and, hopefully, transcend conflicts that disrupt our
community and perpetuate injustice. Neither law nor science
requires or permits a universal solution framed in terms of
sameness or difference, regardless of the question under consideration. Instead, they demand that we move toward a new paradigm
that encourages judges, scientists, and citizens to put difference in
its proper place and thereby find our common ground.

a new kind of partnership between social scientists and local communities.
Social scientists could help members of local communities conduct their
own research into the needs and wants of people in their community for
social supports for pregnant women and new parents. The very process of
conducting such research can ... constructively address the specific
constellation of attitudes and resources in the community.

Id. at 249-50.

